Introduction
Collateral is central in the law and finance literature. Various theories and empirical studies highlight the links between enforceability of secured contracts and access to external finance (e.g. Calomiris, Larrain, Liberti and Sturgess, 2017; Haselmann, Pistor and Vig, 2010; Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee and Visaria, 2012; Vig, 2013) , and the availability of collateral and debt capacity in the presence of contract incompleteness (e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Hart and Moore, 1994) . Studies find that the lack of sufficient collateral is a key obstacle to access to external finance across countries. The problem is aggravated in countries with weak collateral laws, because inadequate legal infrastructure excludes important asset types, for instance, movable assets, from permissible collateral classes. On the other hand, legal reforms on collateral law also have a dark side: banks may rely excessively on collateral and reduce incentives for adequate screening, consequently allowing riskier borrowers to obtain loans and worsening credit allocation efficiency (Manove, Padilla and Pagano, 2001; Zazzaro, 2005; Jappelli, Pagano and Bianco, 2005) .
In this paper, we provide new evidence from China on how legal reform on permissible collateral affects firms' access to bank credit, credit allocation and firm performance. An investigation in the Chinese context is fruitful given the distinct features of the Chinese banking sector: firstly banks are not fully commercialized yet and bank lending is often compromised by state intervention, and secondly, legal institutions are generally perceived as weak and inefficient, hence credit allocation is affected by both informal and formal institutions. Under these circumstances, it is a priori unclear whether legal reforms could effectively promote firms' access to finance and improve credit allocation efficiency. The answers to these questions may also provide new perspectives for understanding the accumulation of non-performance loans and the on-going debate on deleveraging in China.
To address these issues, we take advantage of the introduction of the Chinese Property Law in the end of 2006, which expanded the contracting space in secured transactions by allowing large classes of movable assets as permissible collateral. Before the Property Law, secured transactions were governed by the 1995 Security Law, which restricted the scope of permissible collateral to immovable assets (e.g. land and buildings) and a small class of movable assets (e.g. equipment and motor vehicles). Other important asset classes such as accounts receivable and inventory were either excluded from the pool of permissible collateral or allowed only by way of possessory security interests. The Property Law removed these restrictions by allowing a broad class of movable assets
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As the Property Law reform only pertains to movable assets, it should affect more the firms with intensive use of these assets. This policy wrinkle allows for an investigation in a difference-indifferences framework, which is ideal for such a quasi-experimental setting, because it eliminates observed and unobserved factors that affect treated and untreated firms alike (see e.g. Roberts and Whited, 2013) . Specifically in this context, the effect of the Property Law is identified by comparing the responses of firms that ex-ante rely more on movable assets (high movable firms) with those of firms that rely less on movable assets (low movable firms).
Using a sample of listed firms from China during 2001-2011, we establish several main findings. Firstly, allowing movable assets as collateral expanded borrowers' access to formal finance, and prolonged debt maturity. Compared to low movable firms (control group), high movable firms (treated group) experienced a relative increase in both total leverage and long-term leverage after the reform. These changes are economically significant: for instance, long-term leverage increased by 4.8% more for high movable firms, amounting to 40% of the sample mean. In contrast,
short-term leverage did not show differential changes for high movable and low movable firms.
However, we also find such credit expansion was mainly driven by ex-ante low quality firms, indicating inefficiency in credit allocation. This evidence is consistent with the theoretical models of Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001) , Zazzaro (2005) , and Jappelli, Pagano and Bianco (2005) , that legal reforms which improve the value of collateral ease firms' credit constraints, but at the same time, these reforms create incentives for banks to screen inadequately and rely excessively on collateral, consequently worsen the efficiency of credit allocation.
Changes in capital structure due to the legal reform is also accompanied by changes in asset structure. We find high movable firms increased more in size relative to low movable firms, and such change was mainly driven by more fixed asset investments. Specifically, Fixed assets of high movable firms increased by 7.6% more than those of low movable firms, a highly economically significant result, as it amounts to 24% of sample average. These findings together with previous evidence that firms extended their debt maturity is consistent with the view that firms may have employed the extra credit to match asset and debt maturity (e.g. Myers, 1977; Milbradt and Oehmke, 2014) . Finally, we do not find evidence that firm performance experienced differential changes across high and low movable firms after the Property Law.
These results are obtained controlling for firm and year fixed effects, which capture systematic differences across firms and general time trends. These effects are also independent from BOFIT-Institute for Economies in Transition Bank of Finland BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/ 2018 7 industry (provincial) time-varying shocks, because we control explicitly for fixed effects interaction terms between industry (provincial) and year. In addition, we validate the parallel trend assumption by investigating whether our findings persist for placebo reforms, which is a crucial assumption for the difference-in-differences framework. Nevertheless, other confounding factors could provide alternative explanations to the previous findings. We proceed by investigating these possible explanations.
We first validate other changes brought about by the Property Law, such as improvements in creditor rights or property rights protection, are unlikely to drive our findings. This paper is also related to studies examining how enforceability of secured contracts affects lending (e.g. Calomiris, Larrain, Liberti and Sturgess, 2017; Haselmann, Pistor and Vig, 2010; Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee and Visaria, 2012; Vig, 2013) , and how the collateral channel affects capital structure and investment (e.g. Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar, 2012; Campello and Giambona, 2013; Cvijanovic, 2014; Gan, 2007; Benmelech, 2009; Kim and Kung, 2017) . These analyses focus on the value, availability or re-use of assets which have been permitted as collateral, while we focus on the permissibility of assets to be used as collateral in the first place.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of the institutional background governing secured transactions in China. Section 3 describes identification strategy, data and key variables. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 discusses various alternative explanations and robustness tests. Finally, Section 6 concludes. interests. In practice, the amount of inventory had to be fixed at the time of financing and was required to be relocated (or the ownership certificate had to be transferred) to creditors.
Furthermore, a secured interest had to be registered to be enforceable, while no centralized registration system existed. In China, numerous registries dealt with different types of collateral, and had ultimate discretion in rejecting or accepting the registration of secured interests. Moreover, these registries required collateral to be appraised and the legality of security agreements to be certified. As a result, creating and registering secured interests was costly, time consuming and subject to uncertainty. Another problem was that the Security Law did not provide clear rules on the determination of priority among competing claims on the same collateral. Secured lenders might have to compete with other claimants for underlying collateral, which in turn increased the cost of credit.
The limited permissible asset types and prohibitive process in creating and registering secured interest impeded secured transactions using movable assets as collateral. As a result, secured transactions strongly favored real property as security when lending to enterprises. World Bank Group (2007) shows that less than 7% of loans in China were secured purely by movables assets, which were mostly inventories and equipment. Under the new law, the range of permissible security was greatly expanded, which now includes accounts receivables, existing and future production equipment, raw materials, semi-finished goods and inventories. The registration of security interests is also simplified: for general movable assets (except receivables), the registration can be done at the local office of the SAIC for the county in which the debtor is domiciled, and it requires only basic information about the parties, the debt and the underlying security.
In addition, specific rules and registration systems are created to guide secured transactions in receivables, which are arguably one of the most important movable asset classes. Accounts re- sets up a search system to publicize registration information of the pledge of accounts receivables, which allows lenders to obtain information about borrowers or other registered security interests.
Apart from allowing more permissible collateral and establishing centralized registration systems, the Property Law also provides clearer references to the determination of priorities among competing claims on the same collateral. Specifically, priority is determined by the date of registration of security interests.
As the result of these legal changes, secured transactions against movable assets have ex- we then divide firms into three equal sized bins, and denote the firms in the highest 33% of movable assets ratio as treated firms, and the firms with the lowest 33% as control firms. We expect that firms in the treated group to be affected more by the passage of the Property Law. Specifically, our generalized difference-in-differences specification is as follows:
where i indexes for firm and t for accounting year. Yit represents outcomes of interest, including for instance various leverage measures defined later. Firm fixed effects α i control for time-invariant 4 Our main results hold if pre-reform movable ratio is defined based on 2005 value instead of median calculated over 2001-2005. Using median value over pre-reform era avoids the possibility that movable assets could be cyclical in nature.
5 and ℎ do not enter the regression as stand-along variables because they are absorbed by year fixed effects and firm fixed effects.
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Bank of Finland BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/ 2018 13 differences between treatment and control groups, while the time fixed effects γ t control for aggregate time-varying shocks. Highmovi is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm belongs to the treatment group (i.e. firm located in the top 33% of pre-reform median movable ratio) and zero if it belongs to the control group (i.e. firms located in the bottom 33% of pre-reform median movable ratio). Aftert is a binary variable that takes the value one for the years after the Property Law reform (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) , and zero otherwise (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) . We exclude observations from 2006 to mitigate concerns on any anticipation effect. X denotes a set of control variables including: Sizeit-1, 6 Tangi- (2004), standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The difference-in-differences estimator is β, which measures the pre-post difference in the outcome of interest of firms with a high movable ratio, relative to the pre-post difference of firms with a low movable ratio.
One concern with this specification is that some industry specific shocks occurred around the enactment of the law, and these industries have higher movable asset ratio. To address this issue, the baseline specification is augmented with Industry-Year fixed effects to control for time-varying industry specific shocks. Similarly, Province-Year fixed effects are included to control for timevarying regional economic shocks. Section 5 discusses further the robustness of the main specification.
Data and key variables
Our sample is composed of firms listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange covering 2001-2011. As required by China Stock Regulatory Committee, listed firms report regularly detailed balance sheet and income statement information. We obtain these data from a database called WIND Information. This database also provides information of listed firms such as industry classification, location, established year, listed year and ownership type, etc. Crucially it also contains a detailed breakdown of firms' liabilities, including information on total debt, long-term debt, short-term debt, and detailed breakdowns of asset categories. 7 We exclude firms from financial in-Bing Xu
Permissible collateral and access to finance: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment 14 dustries and firms with missing values in total assets. As discussed before, we also exclude observations from 2006 in order to mitigate concerns of any anticipation effect. In addition, in order to be qualified for inclusion in the sample, firms are required to have annual reports both before and after 2006. In total, our whole sample contains more than 12,000 firm-year observations from around 1200 firms, and covers 58 industries. The sample is also well-represented geographically, as it includes firms located from all 31 provinces of mainland China. Panel B provides the summary statistics on the liabilities side. Total firm leverage is defined as the ratio of debt over lagged assets (Debtt/Assett-1), where Debtt is the sum of long-term debt (LongDebtt) and short-term debt (ShortDebtt). 8 The average Debtt/Assett-1 is 0.33, with a standard deviation of 0.22. Total leverage is further decomposed into long-term leverage (LongDebtt/Assett-1) and short-term leverage (ShortDebtt/Assett-1). Average long-term leverage is 0.12, while that of short-term leverage is 0.19. These figures suggest that the majority of corporate debt of these listed firms is short-term.
Panel C reports the summary statistics on the assets side and profitability. The mean value of Log(1+Assett) is 21.25, which translates to an average firm book value around RMB 1,600 million. Average firm net profitability (Netprofitt/Assett-1) is 3.5%. Finally, Panel D describes briefly the control variables employed in the analysis. Tangibility is defined as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets (FixedAssett/Assett). Average tangibility is 0.29. Liquidity is defined as cash divided by total assets (Casht/Assett). Average liquidity is 0.16. Profitability is defined as the ratio of net profits over total assets (Netprofitt/Assett). Sale is the logarithm of one plus total sales. Age is defined as the logarithm of one plus the number of years since the incorporation of the firm. The average age is 11 years. List is a dummy variable that equals one for firm-year observations after the firm's IPO, and zero otherwise. Split is a dummy variable that equals one for firm-year observations after a firm's completion of the split-share reform (discussed later), and zero otherwise. State is a dummy variable that equals one if the controlling shareholder is the government and zero if the controlling shareholder is a private entity.
Results
This section presents the main results. In section 4.1, we report the effects of the Property Law reform on corporate leverage and debt maturity. Next, we discuss whether the reform improved the efficiency of credit allocation in section 4.2. Section 4.3 investigates the real effects of the Property
Law reform, such as its impact on asset structure and firm performance.
Debt and debt maturity
This section examines the effect of the Property Law on corporate leverage and debt maturity by estimating specification (1). Table 2 presents the results. The coefficient of interest is on Highmovi*Aftert, which measures the differential effects of the Property Law across firms with high and low pre-reform movable assets. Column (1) examines the effect of the law on total leverage, using Debtt/Assett-1 as outcome variable. The coefficient of interest is 0.069 and statistically significant at 1%. Given that the average leverage ratio is 0.33 in our sample, this result suggests that in relative terms high movable firms increase leverage ratio by 21% more than for low movable firms.
Columns (2) to (3) investigate if the Property Law changed the debt maturity structure. In column (2), long-term leverage (LongDebtt/Assett-1) for high movable firms increased in relative terms by 4.8% more than for low movable firms, and this effect is also statistically significant at 1%. The economic implication is also significant: a 4.8% increase represents 40% of the sample mean. In contrast, short-term leverage (ShortDebtt/Assett-1) in column (3) does not show differential changes between the two types of firms. The DID estimator is 0.009 and statistically insignificant. In unreported tests we obtain similar findings when using level of debt instead of leverage as dependent variables, which rules out the possibility that our results are driven by the variations in the denominator (i.e. total assets).
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These findings are consistent with our hypothesis that better collateral law that permits movable assets as collateral improves firms' access to bank credit. However, somewhat surprising is that short-term leverage does not experience relative changes after the enactment of the Property Law. Indeed, as suggested by columns (1) and (2), the observed relative increases in total leverage is driven entirely by the increases in the long-term leverage. These findings are counterintuitive because short-term debt, if secured, is more likely to be secured by movable assets, and consequently, a legal act that allows more short-term assets to be pledgable should improve mostly firms' access to short-term bank credit. One possible explanation is that for listed firms in China, shortterm debt is less likely to be secured when compared to long-term debt, and therefore, the effects of the Property Law on short term borrowing are less pronounced. 9 As will be discussed in latter section, the expansion in long-term leverage is accompanied by the increases in firms' fixed assets investment, indicating that firms have the tendency to match their debt and asset maturity.
One might suspect that movable assets could be positively related to corporate leverage for reasons other than the pledgability of collateral. For instance, it is possible that firm with more outstanding accounts receivable or more inventory in the past needed to borrow more to keep the company afloat. This argument would imply a positive correlation between the movable assets ratio and leverage at any given point of time. To explore this possibility, we repeat our analysis in columns (4)-(9) for several placebo reforms that happened in years before the actual reform. Since we use lagged control variables and we need at least one year of observation before and after the placebo reforms, we could design two placebo reforms occurring in 2003 and 2004, respectively. In all these tests, Aftert is an indicator variable takes value one for years after the placebo reform, and Highmovi is calculated based on median movable assets ratio measured before each placebo reform. In all the placebo reforms, the coefficients on Highmovi*Aftert are statistically insignificant and economically small compared to the baseline model, indicating no differential effects across firms with high and low level of movable assets before the actual reform. These results rule out the alternative explanation stated above. In addition, these placebo reforms provide validation for the parallel trend assumption, which is crucial for the DID framework.
The efficiency of credit allocation
Having established that the Property Law reform promoted access to bank finance, this section investigates if the reform improved the efficiency of credit allocation in China. The answer to this question is very important as credit misallocation in China caused significant losses to aggregate output (e.g. Hsieh and Klenow, 2009) . Under the assumption that collateral is usually associated with low quality borrowers (e.g. Berger and Udell, 1990, 1995; Jimenez, Salas and Saurina, 2006) , a reform that expands permissible collateral should improve the most the debt capacity of these borrowers. This is because high quality borrowers may access unsecured loans, while low quality borrowers cannot borrow unless the loan is secured. Furthermore, because providing collateral may reduce banks' incentives to screen borrowers adequately (Manove, Padilla and Pagano, 2001 ), this could allow more low quality firms with movable assets to apply for loans. These arguments suggest that the impact of the Property Law on debt capacity should be more pronounced among low quality firms, and consequently worsen the efficiency of credit allocation.
To investigate this hypothesis, we expand the baseline specification with a triple interaction term to test whether low quality firms with more movable assets expanded more access to bank credit. We apply a set of ex-ante firm quality proxies Q, including: return on sales (ROS), indebtedness (Liability Ratio), and Altman's Z-score. Each proxy is measured at the pre-reform median. The baseline specification (1) is then re-estimated after incorporating the triple interaction terms, with
Debtt/Assett-1 as the dependent variable. Table 3 reports results. Consistent with the previous conjecture, the differential increase in Debtt/Assett-1 is mainly driven by low quality firms. For instance, in column (1) the coefficient on the triple interaction term Highmovi*Aftert*PreRosi is statistically negative, indicating that relative credit expansion for high movable firms is less pronounced for firms with higher pre-reform return on sales. In column (2), the positive coefficient on Highmovi*Aftert*PreLiabilityi implies that the relative credit expansion for high movable firms is driven by firms that had been highly indebted before the introduction of the law. Column (3) examines whether firms that are prone to bankruptcy, measured by Altman's Z-scores, experienced larger increase in their debt capacity. The negative coefficient on the triple interaction term Highmovi*Aftert*PreZscorei suggests that firms with higher pre-reform Z-scores, that is firms less prone to bankruptcy, expanded less in their debt capacity.
Overall, these findings indicate that after the introduction of the Property Law, firms that were less profitable, highly indebted, or prone to bankruptcy expanded the most their debt capacity.
This implies that although the Property Law reform relaxed credit constraints, it did not improve (4)- (9). In all these columns, the coefficients on the interaction term are small and statistically insignificant, validating that the parallel trend assumption holds.
Taken together, these results suggest that firms adjusted their asset composition towards longer maturity in terms of more fixed asset investments, but the shifts in asset and debt composi-
tions did not seem to affect profitability. Since high movable firms usually have low levels of tangible assets, our findings imply that firms achieved more balanced asset structures following the reform. This result is in line with the notion that firms match the maturity of assets and liabilities (e.g. Myers, 1977; Milbradt and Oehmke, 2014) : the evidence shows that firms with relatively large amounts of short-term assets (or the high movable firms in this paper) experienced disproportional increases in both long-term debt (section 4.1) and long-term assets (fixed assets). 10 Our findings also lend some support to "credit multiplier" effects (e.g. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 2000;
Campello and Hackbarth, 2012): higher external finance promotes more investments in fixed assets, which in turn could be used as collateral to further increase the debt capacity of these firms. 
Creditor rights and property rights protection
The Property Law not only broadened the scope of assets that could be pledged as collateral, it also improved the protection of creditor rights and property rights, at least in theory. It is therefore crucial to check if these "side effects" are the main drivers of the previous findings.
Creditor rights protection
The Property Law has improved creditor rights protection substantially. Various articles of the Property Law give creditors more power to protect the value of underlying collateral; prevent misusage of secured assets and entitle creditors to order debtors to restore the value of secured assets due to depreciation; and allow creditors to seize secured assets in times of default. 11 These changes could If creditor rights protection drives the previous results, it should post differential impacts on high movable and low movable firms. One possibility is that fixed assets are easier to be evaluated and monitored relative to movable assets, and hence, should default occur, are easier to be ceased by creditors (Vig, 2013; Gopalan, Mukherjee and Singh, 2016) . Consequently, stronger creditor rights protection could affect more firms that ex-ante operate with more fixed assets, which are also potentially low movable firms.
To test for the effect of creditor rights protection, we expand specification (1) LongDebtt/Assett-1 decreases relatively more for firms with more tangible assets (column (2), Ftani*Aftert=-0.128***), while the pattern reverses for ShortDebtt/Assett-1 (column (3), Ftani*Aftert =0.119***). This result implies that firms operating ex-ante with high levels of fixed assets substitute long-term debt for short-term debt after the reform, which is consistent with the notion that stronger creditor rights reduce debt maturity (see e.g. Vig, 2013). But more importantly, controlling for the differential effects of creditor rights protection does not lead to significant changes in the coefficients on Highmovi*Aftert, rejecting the alternative explanation that better creditor rights protection is the main cause for our previous findings. Ideally, if the improvements in property rights protection are similar for high movable and low movable firms, such effects will be differenced out in the DID framework. Nevertheless, a valid concern is that firms with a high share of movable assets benefit disproportionally more from better property rights protection, because movable assets are easier to be expropriated.
This issue is addressed in three ways. The first method explores the heterogeneous improvements in property rights protection for different types of firms. In general, private firms should benefit the most from the improvements in property rights protection (Berkowitz, Lin, and Ma, 2015), while state-owned firms should benefit less because they are well protected (or without welldefined property rights), both before and after the Property Law enactment. Therefore, we augment specification (1) with Privateit and an interaction term Privateit*Aftert to capture the differential impacts of property rights protection, where Privateit is a dummy that equals one if firm i's controlling shareholder is a private entity at time t, and zero otherwise. 14 If better property rights protection improves access to finance, the coefficient on Privateit*Aftert is expected to be positive. Columns (4)-(6) of Table 5 report the results. In column (4) and (5), the coefficients on Privateit*Aftert are statistically insignificant, suggesting that private firms, i.e. firms with worse property rights protection, do not experience relative changes in total leverage and long-term leverage. With respect to 13 See for instance Berkowitz, Lin and Ma (2015) and Zhang (2008) for description of the pre-reform property rights protection and various Articles of the Property Law on improving property rights protection. 14 To control for the possible confounding factor of privatization, the baseline model is re-estimated on a sample of firms that never changed their ownership type throughout the entire sample period. Results remain similar. As another robustness check, firm ownership is re-defined based on the ownership type in 2005 instead of using a time-varying definition. This definition avoids the possibility that firm ownership is endogenous to the Property Law reform. Results remain similar.
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Importantly, after controlling for the differential impacts of property rights protection, the coefficients on Highmovi*Aftert for all debt measures are almost identical to that of the baseline model in Table 2 .
15
The second method explores the ex-ante cross-sectional variation on property rights protection at the provincial level. 16 If lower expropriation risks promote access to finance, one would expect the effect to be stronger for firms located in provinces with high pre-reform expropriation risks. Following Berkowitz, Lin and Ma (2015) Table 5 , columns (7) to (9), the coefficients on Protecti*Aftert are negative and statistically insignificant for all debt measures. Adding Protecti*Aftert also does not affect neither the economic magnitudes nor the statistical significance of the coefficients on Highmovi*Aftert for all regressions.
Lastly, we re-estimated specification (1) on a sample of state-owned firms. This sample offers a relatively clean identification of the causal relationship between permissible collateral and access to finance. This is because state-owned firms are less likely to suffer from pre-mature liquidation risks (due to soft budget constraints and implicit guarantees from government), and their level of property rights protection will not change substantially after the Property Law. To avoid potential confounding factors resulting from changes in ownership, only firms that remained stateowned throughout the entire sample period are included in this sample. Results in columns (10) to (12) of Table 5 show that the coefficients on Highmovi*Aftert are largely consistent with the results 15 Test including both Ftani*Aftert and Privateit*Aftert in specification (1) are conducted but not reported. The assumption of this test is that firms with more fixed assets benefit disproportionally more from better property rights protection, i.e. through the collateral channel (see e.g. Berkowitz, Lin and Ma, 2015 for the full sample. Taken together, these results suggest that better property rights protection is unlikely to be the key driver of our previous findings. According to many observers, these strict rules have successfully reduced tunneling activities (e.g.
Other contemporary reforms
Jiang, Lee and Yue, 2010; Li et al., 2015) . As demonstrated in Jiang, Lee and Yue (2010) , one of the most common ways to tunnel corporate assets is through inter-corporate lending to controlling shareholders and their affiliates. These transactions are registered under the entry "Other Receivables" (OREC), which represent on average 4% of total assets in our sample (see Table 1 ). (1) to (3)) reports the results. Firm leverage decreases relatively more for firms that are prone to tunneling risks after the tunneling reform (column (1), Foreci*Tunnelt= -0.311*), and such relative decrease in total leverage is mainly driven by the relative reduction in short-term leverage (column (3), Foreci*Tunnelt =-0.428***). This result suggests that before the "tunneling reforms", listed firms over-borrowed at short maturities to provide inter-corporate loans to their controlling shareholders, allowing them to expropriate funds from the company. After the "tunneling reforms", firms prone to tunneling reduced disproportionally more their short-term leverage. On the other hand, long-term leverage increased relatively more for firms prone to tunneling risks, as suggested by the positive interaction term in column (2) (Foreci*Tunnelt =0.164***). Taken together, these results suggest that firms which were more prone to tunneling activities before the reforms changed their debt structure after these reforms, reducing their short-term leverage while increasing their long-term leverage. Hence, our findings suggest the reforms starting in 2005 seem to have effectively reduced tunneling activities in China, echoing the results reported in Li et al.
(2015). More importantly for our analysis, controlling for the differential effects of the "tunneling reforms" does not affect the coefficients on Highmovi*Aftert for all debt measures, rejecting the alternative explanation that our baseline results are driven by these reforms.
Split-share reform
The and changed the role of secondary equity markets (Campello, Ribas and Wang, 2014) . These studies also find that the split-share reform promoted access to finance and investment, and generated marked improvements in firms' productivity, profitability and employment. Therefore, it is important to check if our results are driven by the split-share reform instead of the introduction of the Property Law.
To this end, the baseline model is augmented with Splitit and Highmovi*Splitit, where Splitit is a dummy variable that equals one for firm-year observations after a firm's completion of the split- share reform, and zero otherwise. Results are reported in Table 6 , columns (4)-(6). The coefficients on Highmovi*Splitit are statistically insignificant for all dependent variables, implying that there was no differential impact of the split-share reform on corporate leverage. More importantly, the coefficients on Highmovi*Aftert are very similar to the baseline results, suggesting that the effects driven by the introduction of the Property Law were independent from those generated by the split-share reform.
Corporate tax reform
On March 16, 2007, the Enterprise Income Tax Law was enacted and took effect from January 1th,
2008. Earlier, corporate tax rates varied with firm ownership, with foreign firms enjoying a preferential tax rate of 25%, while domestic firms were charged at 33%. The new law equalized the tax rates of domestic and foreign firms at 25%. Assuming that lower taxes improve firm profitability and consequently their repayment capacity, creditors may extend more credit to firms that enjoy larger tax reductions, i.e. domestic firms. Hypothetically, if firms with more movable assets were over-represented by domestic firms and if firms with less movable assets were mostly foreign firms, our results could be explained by the corporate tax reform. To remove this concern, the baseline model is re-estimated for a sample of domestic firms, which benefitted equally from the tax reduction, and consequently, the direct effect of the tax reform on the outcome variables should be cancelled out in a difference-in-differences framework. A firm is classified as domestic if the controlling shareholder is a domestic entity. The results reported in columns (7)- (9) of Table 6 are similar to the baseline model results, hence our results still hold. 
Credit conditions, financial crisis and collateral value

Credit conditions
A concern is that the differential effects on high and low movable firms may reflect the asymmetric responses of firms in the treatment and control groups to changing macroeconomic credit conditions
Bing Xu
Permissible collateral and access to finance: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment 26 rather than to the introduction of the Property Law. It has been long established that financially constrained firms react to changes in credit conditions more strongly than unconstrained firms (Campello, Graham and Harvey, 2010) . Under the assumption that high moveable firms are more likely to be financially constrained, these differential changes could be caused by variations in credit conditions instead of the introduction of the Property Law.
To investigate this possibility, we expand specification (1) with an interaction term between Highmovi and a proxy of credit conditions, which controls for the possibility that high movable firms respond to changes in credit conditions differently from low movable firms. We employ lagged loan to GDP ratio (LoantoGDPt-1) as a proxy of aggregate credit conditions. 21 Data are obtained from the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. Columns (1) to (3) of Table 7 find insignificant coefficients on Highmovi*LoantoGDPt-1 for all leverage measures, which implies that high movable firms do not respond to changes in credit conditions differently from low movable firms.
The interaction term Highmovi*Aftert, if anything is now statistically and economically even more significant than our earlier results from the baseline model. We therefore conclude that the differential effects of the Property Law on high movable versus low movable firms are independent from changes in credit conditions.
Stimulus package
From November 2008 to the last quarter of 2010, China implemented a RMB 4 trillion stimulus package to mitigate the effects from the global financial crisis, which could affect our results if high movable firms received disproportionally more credit thanks to government initiated programs under this package. Table 7 , columns (4)-(6), include an interaction term Highmovi*Stimut to capture the differential effects of the stimulus package on high versus low movable firms, where Stimut is a dummy variable that equals one for the period 2008-2010, and zero otherwise. The coefficients on Highmovi*Aftert become even more significant, both statistically and economically compared to the baseline results in Table 2 .
Financial crisis
The 2008 financial crisis could post also another challenge. Lenders may prefer relatively liquid firms during crisis periods and hence may extend disproportionally more credit to firms with more 21 Alternative proxy such as lagged M2/GDP produces similar results, which are available upon request.
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Bank of Finland BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/ 2018 27 movable assets. To address this issue, we check if our results still hold for a sample that ends in 2007, one year before the outbreak of the global financial crisis. 22 Results are reported in columns (7)-(9). The main findings for this sample are largely similar to the results for the whole sample, validating that our previous findings are not driven by financial crisis.
Impact of macroeconomic shocks on fixed assets value
Falling asset prices reduce collateral values and debt capacity (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). Therefore, the relative increase in leverage for high movable firms, which likely to have low levels of fixed assets, could be explained by macroeconomic shocks that reduce the value of fixed assets.
This hypothesis is unlikely to explain our findings for several reasons. Firstly, any time-varying industry or provincial shocks are controlled for because all specifications include both the interaction terms Industry*Year and Province*Year. As a result, only shocks that have differential impacts on the fixed assets' value of treated and control firms within the same industry and within the same province are of concern. It is very hard to identify such shocks. Secondly, the value of the most common type of fixed assets, which is land, has been increasing steadily during the sample period (see e.g. Wu, Gyourko and Deng, 2015) . If anything, the collateral value channel would suggest that firms with more fixed assets should have had better access to external finance, which we find not to be the case. 23 Lastly, the differential effects of the Property Law are strong for a sample of stateowned firms only (Table 5 , columns (10)-(12)), which are less financially constrained (Allen, Qian and Qian, 2005; Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2010) and hence changes in collateral values should not affect their access to external finance (Wu, Gyourko and Deng, 2015) . Taken together, it seems highly unlikely that changes in the values of fixed assets are able to explain our findings.
22 Another way to address this is to estimate the model for another crisis period before the enactment of the Property Law. Finding results consistent with previously reported would attribute the observed differential effects to financial crisis instead of the Property Law. The 1998 East Asian Financial Crisis could have fitted for such a placebo test. Unfortunately, the key variable movable assets ratio cannot be computed for years before 2000 when most of the firms do not report their level of movable assets. 23 Wu, Gyourko and Deng (2015) FZi is a continuous measure equals the firm's pre-reform median firm characteristic Z. For the sake of brevity, only the results controlling for Liquidity, Leverage and Profitability are reported in Table   8 . 24 The coefficients on Highmovi*Aftert when Debtt/Assett-1 is the dependent variable range from 0.049 to 0.08, and all are significant at 1%. For LongDebtt/Assett-1, the coefficients on Highmovi*Aftert center around 0.048, and all are significant at 1%. In line with our previous results, we do not find differential effects on high versus low movable firms for ShortDebtt/Assett-1 across all specifications. Importantly, these results still hold when controlling for pre-reform leverage (columns (4)- (6)), suggesting that our findings cannot be explained by mean reversal of debt usage. Taken together, these results validate our finding that the movability of assets drives the differential effects between high and low movable firms, instead of other innate firm features.
Other robustness tests
Finally, some additional robustness tests are available upon request, including 1) Re-estimation based on continuous measures of treatment, defined as the pre-reform median movable assets ratio, or movable assets ratio measured in 2005 (i.e. one year before the reform); 2) Reclassification of movable assets: although accounts receivable and inventory are the main categories of movable assets, there are other asset types that became pledgable after the reform, including for instance, future equipment and raw materials. We therefore broaden the definition of movable assets class by defining the movable ratio as (CurrentAssett-Casht)/Assett. 3) Re-estimation over alternative samples: a) sample of firms that have been listed throughout the entire sample period, to alleviate the concern that differential reputational improvements due to listing or accessibility to capital markets 24 Including all pre-reform characteristics altogether in one regression also does not exert meaningful changes to the coefficients on Highmovi*Aftert. All these results are available from the author upon request.
might drive the results; 25 b) a sample of firms that never changed their ownership type throughout the sample period, which removes possible confounding effects due to privatization. In all these tests, the DID coefficients for all dependent variables are remarkably stable and are consistent with our main results.
Conclusions
The Property Law was a milestone in reforming the protection of property and creditor rights in China. It also transformed the landscape of secured transactions in China, although this aspect of the Property Law has received little academic attention. This study provides the first evidence for
China that the expansion of permissible collateral improved the access to external finance and prolonged the maturity of debt. However, the reform did not improve the efficiency of credit allocation among Chinese firms. We find that the extra credit that became available due to the legal reform was mostly taken by firms that were less profitable, highly indebted, and prone to bankruptcy. This finding is in line with the literature on the allocation efficiency of credit expansion (e.g. Mian and Sufi, 2009; Assuncao, Benmelech and Silva, 2014) . The Property Law reform also allowed firms to invest more in fixed assets. However, we do not find evidence that firms improved their performances after the Property Law.
Taken together, this paper shows that legal reform that expands permissible collateral improves the access of firms to external financing. Our results provide important implications for policy. Firstly, collateral reform may decrease banks' screening incentives and allow riskier borrowers to obtain extra credit, and consequently risks to financial stability may develop (e.g. Manove, Padilla and Pagano 2001; Zazzaro, 2005; Jappelli, Pagano and Bianco, 2005) . In recent years, non-performing loans in China have increased significantly, which may be associated to some extent with an inefficient allocation of credit. Secondly, the availability of more credit driven by an expansion of permissible collateral also may have caused higher leverage or overinvestment, with potential detrimental effects on firm profitability and overall economic performance. These concerns highlight the importance of accompanying collateral law reform with other structural reforms to improve the overall efficiency of credit allocation. For instance bank competition and privatization of bank ownership should be promoted in order to ensure that lending decisions will be made on commercial grounds. 25 All firms in the sample are eventually listed at stock exchanges, but their annual reports started to be published several years before the actual listings. Tangibilityt is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets (FixedAssett/Assett). Liquidityt is cash divided by total assets (Casht/Assett). Profitabilityt is the ratio of net profits over total assets (Netprofitt/Assett). Salet is the logarithm of one plus total sale. Aget is defined as the logarithm of one plus the number of years since incorporation. Listt is a dummy variable equals one for firm-year observation after firm's IPO, and zero otherwise. Splitt is a dummy variable equals one for firm-year observation after firm's completion of the split-share reform, and zero otherwise. Statet is a dummy variable equals one if the controlling shareholder is government and zero if the controlling shareholder is private entity.
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Permissible collateral and access to finance: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment 34 This table estimates the following specification:Y it = α i + γ t + βHighmov i * After t + δX + ε it , where i indexes for firm and t for year. The dependent variables are Debtt/Assett-1 (DT/TA), LongDebtt/Assett-1 (LD/TA), and ShortDebtt/Assett-1 (SD/TA), respectively. α i and γ t are firm and year fixed effects, respectively. Aftert is a dummy variable equals one for the years 2007-2011, and zero otherwise. Highmovi equals one if i's pre-reform median movable ratio belongs to the top tertile, and zero if in the bottom tertile. X is a set of firm specific control variables and ε it is error term. Columns (4)-(9) report results for placebo reforms takes place in 2003 and 2004, respectively. For these placebo reforms, the sample ends by year-end of 2005. In these placebo regressions, Aftert is an indicator variable that takes value one for years after the placebo reform, and Highmovi is measured over years before the each placebo reform. Standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * implies significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. This table presents subsample estimations using the following specification:Y it = α i + γ t + β 1 Highmov i * After t * PreQ + β 2 Highmov i * After t + β 3 PreQ * After t + δX + ε it , where i indexes for firms and t for year. PreQi is a set of continuous proxies of pre-reform firm quality, including: return on sales (ROS), indebtedness (Liability Ratio), and Altman's Z-score. Each proxy is measured at the pre-reform median. The dependent variable is Debtt/Assett-1 (DT/TA). α i and γ t are firm and year fixed effects, respectively. Aftert is a dummy variable equals one for the years 2007-2011, and zero otherwise. Highmovi equals one if i's pre-reform median movable ratio belongs to the top tertile, and zero if in the bottom tertile. X is a set of firm specific control variables and ε it is error term. All specifications include firm specific control variables, firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, Industry*Year fixed effects, and Province*Year fixed effects. ε it is error term. Standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * implies significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Permissible collateral and access to finance: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment 36 This table estimates the following specification: Y it = α i + γ t + βHighmov i * After t + δX + ε it , where i indexes for firms and t for year. The dependent variables are Log(1+Assetit) (LogTA), FixedAssetit/Assetit-1 (FA/TA), and Profitit/Assetit-1 (Profit/TA), respectively. α i and γ t are firm and year fixed effects, respectively. In column (1)-(3), Aftert is a dummy variable equals one for the years 2007-2011, and zero otherwise; and Highmovi equals one if i's pre-reform median movable ratio belongs to the top tertile, and zero if in the bottom tertile. X is a set of firm specific control variables and ε ijt is error term. Columns (4)-(9) report results for placebo reforms took place in 2003 and 2004, respectively. In these placebo regressions, Aftert is an indicator variable that takes value one for years after the placebo reform, and Highmovi is measured over years before the each placebo reform. The sample ends by year-end of 2005 for these placebo reforms. Standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * implies significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Columns (1)-(9) estimate the following:Y it = α i + γ t + βHighmov i * After t + β 1 Protection * After t + δX + ε it , where i indexes for firms, j for industries, and t for year. The dependent variables are Debtt/Assett-1 (DT/TA), LongDebtt/Assett-1 (LD/TA), and ShortDebtt/Assett-1 (SD/TA), respectively. α i and γ t are firm and year fixed effects, respectively. ε it is error term. Aftert is a dummy variable equals one for the years 2007-2011, and zero otherwise. Highmovi equals one if i's pre-reform median movable ratio belongs to the top tertile, and zero if in the bottom tertile. Protection is represented by Ftani, Privateit, or Protecti, respectively. Ftani is a continuous variable equals to firm's pre-reform median FixedAsset/Asset ratio. Privateit is a dummy equals one if firm i's controlling shareholder at time t is a private entity, and zero otherwise. Protecti is a continuous variable that equals the pre-reform median producer protection index of the province where the firm i locates. Columns (10)-(12) estimate specification (1) for a sample of state-owned firms. All specifications include firm specific control variables, firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, Industry*Year fixed effects, and Province*Year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at firm level, except in columns (7)-(9) are clustered at province level. ***, **, and * implies significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Permissible collateral and access to finance: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment 38 Table 6 Other contemporary reforms This table estimates the differential effects of other reforms. The dependent variables are Debtt/Assett-1 (DT/TA), LongDebtt/Assett-1 (LD/TA), and ShortDebtt/Assett-1 (SD/TA), respectively. Tunnel Reform columns (columns (1) to (3)) estimate the following: Y it = α i + γ t + βHighmov i * After t + β 1 Forec i * Tunnel t + δX + ε it In this specification, Highmovi equals one if i's pre-reform median movable ratio belongs to the top tertile, and zero if in the bottom tertile. Foreci is a continuous measure equals to firm i´s median level of other receivables to assets ratio (Other Receivables/Asset), measured for the pre-tunneling reform (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) period. Tunnelt is a dummy equals one for years from 2005 to 2011, and zero otherwise. Split-Share Reform (columns (4) to (6)) estimate:Y it = α i + γ t + βHighmov i * After t + β 1 Highmov i * Split it + β 2 Split it + δX + ε it . In this specification, Splitit equals one for firm-year observations after firm's completion of split-share reform, and zero otherwise. Tax Reform columns (columns (7) to (9)) estimate specification (1) for a sample of domestic firms. In all specifications, i indexes firms and t indexes year. α i and γ t are firm and year fixed effects, respectively. Aftert is a dummy variable that equals one for the years 2007-2011, and zero otherwise. All specifications include firm specific control variables, firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, Industry*Year fixed effects, and Province*Year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * implies significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Columns (1)-(6) estimate the following specification:Y it = α i + γ t + βHighmov i * After t + β 1 Highmov i * Shock + δX + ε it , where i indexes for firms and t for year. The dependent variables are Debtt/Assett-1 (DT/TA), LongDebtt/Assett-1 (LD/TA), and ShortDebtt/Assett-1 (SD/TA), respectively. α i and γ t are firm and year fixed effects, respectively. ε it is error term. Aftert is a dummy variable that equals one for the years 2007-2011, and zero otherwise. Highmovi equals one if i's pre-reform median movable ratio belongs to the top tertile, and zero if in the bottom tertile. Shock is represented by LoantoGDPt-1 (columns (1) to (3)) or Stimut (columns (4) to (6)), where LoantoGDPt-1 is lagged loan to GDP ratio and Stimut is a dummy variable that takes on value one for years 2008 to 2010 and zero otherwise. Columns (7) to (9) estimate specification (1) for a pre-crisis sample (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . All specifications include firm specific control variables, firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, Industry*Year fixed effects, and Province*Year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * implies significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
BOFIT-Institute for Economies in Transition
Bing Xu
Permissible collateral and access to finance: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment 40 This table estimates the following specification:Y it = α i + γ t + βHighmov i * After t + β 1 FZ i * After t + δX + ε it , where i indexes for firms and t for year. The dependent variables are Debtt/Assett-1 (DT/TA), LongDebtt/Assett-1 (LD/TA), and ShortDebtt/Assett-1 (SD/TA), respectively. α i and γ t are firm and year fixed effects, respectively. ε it is error term. Aftert is a dummy variable that equals one for the years 2007-2011, and zero otherwise. Highmovi equals one if i's pre-reform median movable ratio belongs to the top tertile, and zero if in the bottom tertile. FZi is pre-reform median value of firm characteristic Z, including pre-liquidity (Fcashi), pre-leverage (Flevi), and pre-profitability (Fpfti), respectively. All specifications include firm specific control variables, firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, Industry*Year fixed effects, and Province*Year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * implies significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
